1.
Introduction.
Nonprofit organizations are generally exempt from local taxes, 1 a feature that can distress cash-strapped towns and cities with significant numbers of nonprofits. Since nonprofit organizations commonly generate little in the way of net income, the primary tax benefit of their status lies in the exemption from local property taxes. A tax-exempt, nonprofit organization that locates in a town may deliver valuable services, provide employment, and attract visitors and tax-paying residents, but its ownership of local real estate lowers the property tax base and thereby reduces resources otherwise available to town governments.
In recent years, local governments have increasingly asked nonprofit organizations to make payments in lieu of taxes, or PILOTs. Although as a legal matter PILOTs are voluntarystate property tax exemptions for charitable nonprofits are often guaranteed by statute and, sometimes, by state constitutions -in practice they may not exhibit all of the characteristics of truly voluntary transfers. Nonprofits benefit along with others from robust fiscal conditions in their states and localities, and some nonprofits have collaborated with municipalities to develop PILOT programs. But many nonprofits would not voluntarily divert resources from their exempt purposes -indeed they may be legally obligated to refrain from doing so -in the absence of suasion by state and local governments. Unhappy governments can make life difficult for nonprofits by limiting access to local public services, failing to relieve burdensome local regulation, or challenging tax exemptions on the basis of whether nonprofits properly pursue their exempt purposes. In such environments nonprofits may feel considerable pressure to accede to local requests for PILOTs.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of PILOTs and the impact of PILOTs on nonprofit activity. Since nonprofits are not required to disclose PILOTs on any government filing, the available comprehensive evidence comes instead from government financial disclosures identifying PILOT receipts by town. Uniquely, the state of Massachusetts reports data on PILOT receipts by its local jurisdictions, which the study analyzes to identify factors associated with PILOT payments and their effect on the nonprofit sector.
The evidence indicates that PILOT receipts by Massachusetts communities are positively correlated with local property tax rates: a local property tax rate one percent higher is associated with 0.3 percent higher PILOTs, controlling for values of taxable and exempt property in a jurisdiction. This pattern suggests that PILOTs function as informal low-rate substitutes for property taxes to which taxable landowners would ordinarily be subject, and raises the possibility that PILOTs might have other attributes of property taxes, including that they could discourage nonprofit activity, particularly any activity associated with holding tax-exempt property. The evidence from IRS Form 990 filings by Massachusetts nonprofits evidence is consistent with this interpretation of PILOTs, as higher PILOT rates are associated with reduced numbers of nonprofits, reduced nonprofit assets and revenues, and most dramatically, reduced real property holdings.
Section 2 of the paper reviews the limited available survey evidence of the national scope of PILOTs and their impact on the nonprofit sector. Section 3 presents a model of governmental and nonprofit action that offers a reconciliation of the voluntary nature of PILOTs with an effect of PILOTs on nonprofit activity. Section 4 describes the Massachusetts PILOT data, and section 5 presents empirical estimates of the factors determining PILOTs and the effect of the resulting payments on the behavior of nonprofits. Section 6 is the conclusion.
PILOTs in practice.
One of the primary benefits of nonprofit status is exemption from various state taxes. In the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, corporations that are exempt from federal taxation under I.R.C. § 501 are also exempt from Massachusetts excise (income) taxes (Massachusetts General Laws Annotated, 2015) . The board of assessors in each Massachusetts municipality grants exemption from local property taxes according to state law, and administers those exemptions.
Roughly speaking, the property of religious entities (Mass G.L. c. 59) and charities "established for literary, benevolent, charitable, or temperance purposes," and operated as such, are granted local property and sales tax exemptions (Massachusetts General Laws Annotated, 2013a requests payments from charities with property valued at more than $15 million, with the plan that after a ramp up period these charities will contribute PILOTs in the amount of 25 percent of the full amount a property owner would owe if the property were taxable; in addition, participating charities may receive up to a 50 percent credit on their payments for providing value in the form of community benefits (Rakow, 2013) . with a 2.5 percent annual increase (Tartakoff, 2005 Given this reliance on property taxes, it is not surprising that estimates of foregone taxes from charitable property taxes are also large. One estimate of foregone taxes from charitable property tax exemptions ranges from $8 to $13 billion annually in 1997, or 1.3-2.1 percent of total U.S. nonprofit revenue (Cordes et al. 2002) . There is considerable variation between locations and among nonprofits in the same location. Cordes et al. (2002) Aside from the practical need for revenues, some scholars have argued that it is inequitable to offer tax exemptions to nonprofits that provide benefits to those who live elsewhere, such as an urban hospital that provides services to suburban patients (Pomp, 2004; Rokoff, 1973) . Pomp (2004) notes that Connecticut makes payments to municipalities to offset this apparent injustice.
There are different ways to characterize PILOT payments. Some PILOTs take the form of payments for services such as police or fire protection. Others are characterized as simple donations, made for example to help a suffering locality get through a tough time, or investments intended to make the locality more attractive and thereby improve the environment for the nonprofit. And some PILOTs are made to prevent threatened community action that would have the effect of imposing costs on nonprofits. These different characterizations have legal and perceptual effects that may affect how willingly a nonprofit makes a payment.
PILOTs are typically negotiated on an ad hoc basis, raising the problem that similar charities are treated differently (Brody, 2012 percent of the PILOT revenues they identify, though this may partly reflect the survey method.
Determination and impact of PILOTs.
In the absence of external pressure nonprofit organizations are unlikely to provide
PILOTs to their local communities: despite their interest in the welfare of these communities, nonprofits generally have much greater perceived need for resources than funds available to satisfy those needs. Consequently, towns that seek PILOTs must offer nonprofits valuable services in return, persuade nonprofits of the importance of making such payments, or suggest the possibility of costly regulatory or other measures if they fail to provide PILOTs. Payments received under threat of a worse alternative have much of the character of compulsory taxes, and can be analyzed in a similar fashion.
It is useful to consider the case in which a town approaches a nonprofit with a requested PILOT that is expressed as   a b  , in which a is a minimum payment that is possibly a function of the nonprofit's characteristics,  is the nonprofit's property holding in the town, and b is the extent to which PILOT requests rise with property holdings. The town gets this PILOT by making the nonprofit aware of the adverse consequences, to the nonprofit and to the town, of failure to provide the PILOT. Failure to make a PILOT would thereby impede the ability of nonprofits to pursue their missions, and would also be costly to the town, which benefits from nonprofit services; but the town's point is to encourage PILOT payments, not to depress the quality of nonprofit performance. Other possible consequences of PILOT demands are that some nonprofits may quit the town altogether, and others will respond by changing the nature and scope of their operations, specifically by holding less real property either by scaling back activities or by substituting into less land-intensive activities.
Nonprofits that make PILOTs do not incur these costs, so the town benefits from the full value of their services as well as from the PILOTs. There is nonetheless the consideration that the nonprofit is still tax exempt, so the town loses the potential tax revenue that might otherwise have been generated in the absence of the nonprofit. Consequently, the town's value from having a PILOT-paying nonprofit is given by:   a b      , in which  is the value (to the town) generated by a nonprofit, measured relative to the value of additional tax revenue, and is the foregone property taxes on the property held by the (tax-exempt) nonprofit. Alternatively, a nonprofit that refuses to pay a PILOT and whose operations are thereby diminished by loss of good will with (and value to) the community generates value for the town of
which  reflects the loss of value (to the town) from soured relations with the nonprofit, and   is property holding by a nonprofit that stays in town but does not make PILOTs. Nonprofits that leave town or do not locate there in the first place generate zero value.
An optimizing town chooses the parameters a and b of the PILOT demand function to maximize total value    :
(1)
in which 1 n is the number of PILOT-paying nonprofits in the town and 2 n is the number of nonprofits that remain in town but do not pay PILOTs. Nonprofits differ in the extent to which they are willing to accede to higher PILOT requests or will respond to higher requests by finding alternative locations, reflecting the relative costs and benefits of alternative locations and the differing costs of potential impairment to operations from uncomfortable relations with a town whose PILOT request an organization refuses to meet. As a result, higher PILOT requests discourage a portion of a town's nonprofits from locating in town and from paying PILOTs. To capture a town's incentives to demand PILOTs it is not necessary to model explicitly a nonprofit's benefits and costs of making PILOTs or locating in different towns, as what matters for a town planner is the responsiveness of the nonprofit sector as a whole.
Differentiating the right side of (1) with respect to a and b produces:
The derivatives of 1 n and 2 n with respect to a and b on the right sides of (2a) and (2b) reflect the impact of greater PILOT liability on the willingness of nonprofits as a group to locate in a jurisdiction that requires PILOTs, and once there, to be willing to make PILOTs. From the envelope condition, the burden of making a PILOT can be evaluated assuming that the nonprofit does not change its ownership of real property in response, and the derivates of nonprofit activity should reflect this, so
Making these substitutions, and
Since 1 0 n  , equation (3) Are governments able to offer subsidies to nonprofits by making a < 0? If not, and assuming that the optimal total PILOT is below , then PILOTs will be based entirely on a nonprofit's property holdings. The optimum will be characterized by a = 0, the right side of equation (2a) (2b) is the change in the number of local nonprofits refusing to pay as a result of a change in a town's PILOT demand. Since these organizations do not pay PILOTs, the only reason why this derivative will have a nonzero value is that some of the nonprofits that, at low PILOT rates, would make PILOTs and thereby avoid adverse relations with the town, no longer do so as the PILOT rate increases. The nonprofits that stop making PILOTs either leave the jurisdiction or stay and accept the consequences. Hence it is possible to
  is the rate at which nonprofits that refuse to make
PILOTs remain in a jurisdiction as regulated entities.
With this definition of  , setting a and the right side of (2b) both equal to zero produces:
Further simplification is available by defining
which together with (4) yields:
The left side of (6) is the PILOT rate (per value of real property) chosen by an optimizing government. The first term on the right side of (6) indicates that higher property tax rates are associated with greater PILOT demands, reflecting the costs that nonprofits impose on local governments in removing property from the tax rolls. Higher values of  , and of    , reduce the effect of local property tax rates on PILOT demands, since some nonprofits refusing to make PILOTs will nonetheless remain in the community and thereby depress property tax collections.
Greater responsiveness of  to b, as measured by the semi-elasticity in the numerator of the right side of (5), increases and thereby (in (6)) increases b, reflecting the value of discouraging nonprofits that make PILOTs from large holdings of otherwise-taxable property. A large semielasticity of unregulated nonprofit activity with respect to a, which appears in the denominator of the right side of (5), reduces and thereby reduces b due to the potential effect of high rates of b in discouraging nonprofit activity. The numerator of the second term on the right side of (6) is a weighted average of and  , with weights   1   on  , reflecting the potential loss of nonprofit value if nonprofits leave a jurisdiction, and  on  , reflecting the cost of regulating a nonprofit that defies the government's request for a PILOT. Higher values of  reduce the importance of these considerations for reasons similar to the effect of on the first term of the right side of equation (6). And the third term on the right side of (6) indicates that greater responsiveness of the size of the nonprofit sector reduces optimal PILOT demands.
Local jurisdictions with greater revenue needs will generally be more willing than others to demand higher PILOTs at the expense of losing some nonprofit activity. There are two aspects to this implication of the model. The first is that towns that perceive greater benefits of government spending relative to private income will have higher property tax rates. Strictly speaking,  , a and b are jointly determined, so the model should not be interpreted to deliver the effect of changes in  on the values of a and b. As a practical matter, however, property tax collections greatly exceed PILOT receipts, so  is a measure of local revenue needs, and one can interpret the effect of  on PILOTs to reflect the impact of local revenue needs and the property tax mechanism that towns are forced to use largely to meet these needs.
The second sense in which equation (6) The optimal PILOT rate b in equation (6) therefore captures the effects of several potentially competing considerations. If optimizing town governments had full information and the ability to commit themselves to binding PILOT demands it would not be necessary to impose a PILOT schedule that was a fixed linear function of nonprofit property holdings. Under those conditions an optimizing government could instead design a system that discouraged property holding and incentivized nonprofits to make PILOTs that, if they were any greater, would back the nonprofit into refusal. In this scenario all nonprofits in a town would make PILOTs and none would remain as untaxed regulated entities. It is the absence of some combination of full information, ability to commit, and optimization on the part of town governments that makes actual PILOT demands resemble taxes, in that their actions are insufficiently tailored to specific situations and will influence behavior in possibly inefficient ways. Specifically, towns demanding PILOTs may scare away nonprofits that would otherwise have provided valuable services to the community, and may have to live with the consequences of sometimes soured relations with other nonprofits that stay in town but refuse to make PILOTs.
PILOTs Data
Massachusetts There are some limitations to these data. Since a nonprofit may own property and have activities in more than its home jurisdiction, this method has the potential to introduce measurement error into the classification of the location of nonprofit activity. Another issue is that the data coverage is incomplete, as religious nonprofits, those with annual gross revenues below $25,000, and certain other categories of nonprofits are not required to file Form 990, nor are all the Form 990s submitted to the IRS available in the Guidestar and NCSS data base.
Despite these limitations, the data afford a reasonably accurate depiction of the distribution of nonprofit activity within Massachusetts. property tax rates by town, the ratios of property tax receipts to market values of taxable properties; similarly, average PILOT rates by town are ratios of PILOTs to market values of taxexempt property. PILOT rates average 0.11 percent over the sample period and are of course zero in the 47 towns without PILOTs, while property tax rates average 1.40 percent over the sample period and are higher in the whole sample than they are in towns without PILOTs.
PILOT experiences in Massachusetts
The Massachusetts Department of Revenue data can be used to estimate the extent to which towns with higher average property tax rates also tend to have higher average PILOT rates, as implied by the model sketched in section 3. Massachusetts towns it appears to be the case that higher property tax rates are generally associated with higher PILOT rates. One of the difficulties of analyzing PILOT rate data for small towns is that these ratios can be very sensitive to the behavior of small numbers of nonprofits, and the resulting variability in measured PILOT rates can make it difficult to draw clear inferences about the effect of property tax rates even if there is a strong causal effect. This consideration, together with the reality that larger towns have greater economic and fiscal consequences than smaller towns, motivates the use of regressions in which observations are weighted by town populations. Estimated coefficients from regressions using unweighted observations are presented in appendix tables.
Equation (6) suggests that the determinants of PILOT rates in Massachusetts towns can be estimated the following way:
in which it b is the PILOT rate in town i in year t, it  is the property tax rate in town i in year t, it X is a vector of observable characteristics (population, income, demographics, and others) of town i in year t,  is a parameter to be estimated, and  is a vector of parameters to be estimated; it  is the residual. The empirical work in Tables 2-4 and Appendix Tables 1-2 presents estimates of equation (7) using data for different years and specifications that include different observable variables in the it X vector. Table 2 presents estimated coefficients from Tobit specifications of equation (7) for 2007, the most recent of the sample years. The dependent variable in these regressions is the ratio of PILOTs to the market value of real property held by nonprofits in each town, which can be referred to as the "PILOT rate." The 0.210 coefficient in column 1 indicates that a one percent higher property tax rate is associated with a 0.21 percent higher desired PILOT rate. The regression reported in column 2 adds the log of town population as an independent variable, and the resulting 0.166 coefficient on the property tax rate is a bit smaller in magnitude though still statistically significant. The regression reported in column 3 adds demographic variables to the specification, as result of which the estimated property tax rate coefficient declines further to 0.135, though this coefficient increases in magnitude to 0.178 with the inclusion of additional economic variables in the regression reported in column 4.
The regression coefficients reported in Table 2 are consistent with the model's implication that higher property tax rates are associated with higher PILOT rates. The estimated magnitude of the effect, that one percent higher property tax rates are associated with approximately 0.18 percent higher PILOT rates, should be evaluated in the context of average property tax rates that are about 12 times higher than average PILOT rates. By these measures, a doubling of property tax rates is associated with much more than a doubling, indeed roughly a quadrupling, of PILOT rates. Of course, it is unheard of for property tax rates actually to double, but this exercise illustrates that the regression evidence suggests that PILOT rates are quite sensitive to property rate differences. Property taxes and PILOTs are likewise positively associated and statistically significant, with slightly smaller coefficient magnitudes, in the unweighted regressions reported in Appendix Table 1 .
The positive association of property tax rates and PILOT rates in 2007 is repeated in other years. Figure 3 presents data on property tax rates and PILOT rates over the [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] sample period. Towns are distinguished by average property tax rates over that period, and the heights of the bars reflect median 13-year average PILOT rates of towns in each cell. The patterns in Figure 3 are similar to those in Figure 2 : among larger Massachusetts towns there is a marked positive association of property tax rates and PILOT rates, whereas among smaller Massachusetts towns the association, while still somewhat positive, is considerably noisier. Table 3 with the further addition of economic controls in the regression reported in column 4. These property tax rate coefficients, while somewhat unstable across specifications, nonetheless are statistically significant and of similar magnitudes to those reported in Table 2 , and are also similar to the corresponding coefficients in the unweighted regressions reported in Appendix Table 2 .
The model sketched in section 3 implies not only that towns with higher property tax rates will have higher PILOT rates, but also that towns that can more credibly encourage nonprofits to make PILOTs will have higher rates. In the model, credible encouragement to pay takes the form of greater costs to nonprofits of soured relationships with towns whose PILOT requests they refuse. It is difficult to obtain fully convincing measures of the credibility of costs of refusing to make PILOTs, but municipal experience with property tax referenda offers one measure. Massachusetts limits the extent to which municipalities can increase property tax rates each year, requiring local referenda for certain rate increases. Over the 1995-2007 period, 141 of the 351 Massachusetts communities never had any property tax override referenda; 54 had one or more referenda all of which failed; 55 had one or more referenda all of which passed; and 101 had multiple referenda, some of which passed and some of which failed. Consistent failure to pass property tax referenda is a sign that voters do not support town administrators who propose these referenda, and may reflect more generally a weakness of town administrators that might empower nonprofits to think that they could resist PILOT requests without incurring significant costs. If so, then towns with failed referenda might have lower PILOT rates. considered: those that had one or more referenda, all of which failed, and those that never had referenda. In both cases there was no property tax override, which would presumably have influenced property tax rates and arguably also PILOT rates, so that potential channel of influence is the same for all of the observations. As Figure 4 illustrates, towns in which voters consistently defeat property tax referenda had lower PILOT rates in 2007 than did towns that did not have any property tax referenda from 1995-2007. Table 4 presents estimated coefficients from population-weighted regressions using 2007 data for the sample of 195 towns that either had referenda from 1995-2007 that all failed, or else never had referenda during that time period. The specifications are similar to those in the regressions presented in Table 2 , the only difference being the inclusion of a dummy variable indicating that a town never had property tax override referenda. The estimated property tax rate coefficients are very similar to those reported in Table 2 , and the estimated effect of the absence of failed referenda is positive in all specifications (albeit of marginal statistical significance in columns 2 and 3). The 0.0462 coefficient in column 4 indicates that PILOT rates are significantly higher in towns that never had referenda than in towns with referenda that failed, the difference corresponding to about 40 percent of average PILOT rates for the whole sample as reported in Table 1 . Analogously, the 0.172 and 0.0462 coefficients in column 4 of Table 4 imply that failed referenda have an effect on PILOT rates that is similar in magnitude to having 0.27 percent higher property tax rates, an increase corresponding to 20 percent of mean property tax rates reported in Table 1 .
The Massachusetts data also afford some indication of the effect of PILOTs on nonprofit activity. Table 5 Columns 5-6 of Table 5 report estimated coefficients from regressions in which the dependent variable is the log of aggregate nonprofit fixed asset holdings. The -0.796 coefficient in column 5 indicates that a one percent higher PILOT rate is associated with a 0.8 percent reduction in nonprofit property holding over the sample period. This regression also includes as independent variables the log of local population and the log of per capita household income in 1999, both of which have positive and significant associations with nonprofit fixed assets. The magnitude of the estimated PILOT rate coefficient falls to -0.670 in the column 6 regression in which additional demographic and economic control variables are included, but remains statistically significant.
The large magnitudes of the estimated PILOT rate effects in the regressions reported in columns 5-6 of Table 5 are consistent with PILOTs significantly influencing nonprofit property holdings, but also raise the possibility that variable specification may influence the estimated coefficients. The PILOT rate is the ratio of PILOT receipts to nonprofit property holdings, so classical measurement error in nonprofit property holdings is apt to bias downward the coefficient on the PILOT rate in a regression explaining nonprofit property. In evaluating the likely role that such bias might play in this regression, it is noteworthy that the data used in constructing the dependent variable in the regressions reported in columns 5-6 (Form 990 data from nonprofit filings) differ from the data used to construct PILOT rates (Massachusetts Department of Revenue data on local property assessments). While this difference addresses part of the potential for bias it does not address all of it, since unexplained differences in true nonprofit property holdings that somehow do not translate directly into differences in PILOTs will affect both measures.
Columns 1-2 of Table 5 report estimated coefficients from regressions in which the dependent variable is the log of total nonprofit assets. The -0.211 coefficient in column 1
indicates that nonprofits in towns with higher PILOT rates have fewer assets, though this effect is between one-quarter and one-third as strong as the effect of PILOTs on fixed asset holdings.
The -0.0779 coefficient in the regression reported in column 2 that includes additional demographic and economic controls is considerably smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant.
Columns 3-4 of Table 5 report estimated coefficients from regressions in which the dependent variable is the log of nonprofit revenue. The -0.204 coefficient in column 3 indicates that one percent higher PILOT rates are associated with 0.2 percent lower nonprofit revenue, an effect that declines significantly in magnitude to 0.09 percent, and becomes statistically insignificant, in the column 4 regression that includes additional control variables. From the evidence presented in columns 1-4 of Table 5 it appears that higher PILOT rates are generally associated with reduced nonprofit activity as reflected in asset holdings and total revenue, but that this effect is considerably weaker than the effect of PILOTs on fixed asset holdings.
The regressions presented in columns 7 and 8 of Table 5 estimate the effect of PILOT rates on ratios of fixed assets to total assets. The -0.621 coefficient in column 7 indicates that fixed asset holdings decline significantly as a fraction of total assets as PILOT rates increase.
Inclusion of additional control variables in the regression reported in column 8 has little effect on this estimated association.
Consequently, it appears that one of the primary effects of higher PILOT rates is to change the nature of nonprofit activity in a jurisdiction, moving it away from the use of property that would otherwise be subject to taxation. In the process, higher PILOT rates also appear to discourage nonprofit activity in general. Unfortunately, these regressions are unable to distinguish whether these effects take the form of changing the locations in which nonprofit organizations choose to locate, changing the local activities of nonprofits that locate despite 20 higher PILOT rates, or changing the rates at which nonprofits are formed and dissolved, though hopefully that will be a topic for future research.
Conclusion
The Massachusetts evidence is consistent with a model in which municipalities make PILOT demands that are increasing functions of local property tax rates, reflecting community needs and the costs that nonprofits impose by reducing the local tax base. These PILOT demands have effects similar to those of property and other taxes in discouraging nonprofit activity, particularly fixed asset holdings of nonprofit organizations. Since PILOTs differ from traditional property taxes in being individually negotiated, and on the nonprofit side are nominally voluntary, it is striking that they would have such effects. This pattern suggests that
Massachusetts communities are unable to tailor their PILOT demands with sufficient precision to be able to extract resources from local nonprofits without also influencing their behavior. And the pattern also suggests that nonprofits are sufficiently concerned about the cost of current and future PILOT burdens that they adjust their behavior in response.
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Figure 1 PILOT Rates and Property Tax Rates in 2007
Note to Figure 1 : the figure presents median 2007 PILOT rates for 10 groups of Massachusetts towns, distinguished by their average property tax rates in 2007. A town's PILOT rate is the ratio of its PILOT receipts to the market value of nonprofit property; its average property tax rate is the ratio of property tax collections to the market value of taxable property. Towns in the first property tax decile have the lowest property tax rates, whereas those in the tenth property tax decile have the highest property tax rates. The heights of the bars depict the median PILOT rates of towns in each group. The left figure depicts data for Massachusetts towns with below-median populations; the right figure depicts data for Massachusetts towns with above-median populations. A town's PILOT rate is the ratio of its PILOT receipts to the market value of nonprofit property; its average property tax rate is the ratio of property tax collections to the market value of taxable property. Towns in the first property tax decile in each of the two graphs have the lowest property tax rates, whereas those in the tenth property tax decile have the highest property tax rates. The heights of the bars depict the median PILOT rates of towns in each group. A town's average PILOT rate is the average over the 13-year sample of its annual ratios of PILOT receipts to market values of nonprofit property; its average property tax rate is the 13-year average ratio of its property tax collections to the market value of its taxable property. Towns in the first property tax decile in each of the two graphs have the lowest property tax rates, whereas those in the tenth property tax decile have the highest property tax rates. The heights of the bars depict the median PILOT rates (13-year averages) of towns in each group. Tables 2-5 and Appendix Tables 1-2 . The first two columns present means and standard deviations of the regression variables for the 47 towns that never collected PILOTs from 1995-2007, whereas the third and fourth columns present means and standard deviations of the regression variables for the whole sample of 351 Massachusetts towns.
"PILOT receipts, in $ m" is aggregate town PILOT receipts in millions of real 2000 dollars. "PILOT rate" is the ratio of town PILOT receipts to the market value of its nonprofit property, expressed as a percentage. "property taxes, in $ m" is aggregate town property tax receipts in millions of real 2000 dollars. "Property tax rate" is the ratio of town property tax receipts to the market value of its taxable property, expressed as a percentage. "% of property owned by nonprofits" is the ratio of the market value of property owned by nonprofits to the sum of the market value of nonprofit property and the market value of taxable property.
Note to Note to Table 5 : The table reports estimated coefficients from OLS regressions. The dependent variable in the regressions reported in columns 1-2 is the natural log of one plus total nonprofit assets in a town; the dependent variable in the regressions reported in columns 3-4 is the natural log of one plus total nonprofit revenues in a town; the dependent variable in the regressions reported in columns 5-6 is the natural log of one plus total nonprofit fixed assets (the sum of land, buildings, and equipment) in a town; and the dependent variable in the regressions reported in columns 7-8 is the natural log of one plus the ratio of nonprofit fixed assets to nonprofit total assets. The sample includes observations from 1995-2007. Observations are weighted by town population, and standard errors are clustered by municipality. All of the regressions include year dummy variables; the regression reported in even-numbered columns include the six "Demographic Variables" listed in Table 1 plus the six "Economic Variables" listed in Table 1 . Note to Appendix Table 2 : the table presents estimated coefficients from Tobit regressions in which the dependent variable is the ratio of town PILOT receipts to the market value of its nonprofit property, expressed as a percentage. The sample includes observations from 1995-2007. Observations are unweighted, and standard errors are clustered by municipality. All of the regressions include year dummy variables; the regression reported in column 3 includes the six "Demographic Variables" listed in Table 1 ; and the regression reported in column 4 includes the six "Demographic Variables" listed in Table 1 plus the six "Economic Variables" listed in Table 1 .
